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Abstract—With over 750 million active users, Facebook is the
most famous social networking website. One particular aspect of
Facebook widely discussed in the news and heavily researched
in academic circles is the privacy of its users. In this paper we
introduce a zero day privacy loophole in Facebook. We call this
the deactivated friend attack. The concept of the attack is very
similar to cloaking in Star Trek while its seriousness could be
estimated from the fact that once the attacker is a friend of the
victim, it is highly probable the attacker has indefinite access to
the victims private information in a cloaked way. We demonstrate
the impact of the attack by showing the ease of gaining trust of
Facebook users and being befriended online. With targeted friend
requests we were able to add over 4300 users and maintain access
to their Facebook profile information for at least 261 days. No
user was able to unfriend us during this time due to cloaking
and short de-cloaking sessions. The short de-cloaking sessions
were enough to get updates about the victims. We also provide
several solutions for the loophole, which range from mitigation
to a permanent solution 1.
Keywords-Facebook, Social Network, Privacy, Cloaked Chan-
nel, Cloaked: Nonexistent, Decloaked: Reactivated
I. INTRODUCTION
Facebook, the popular online social network, was founded
by Mark Zuckerberg in 2004. Today it has over 750 million
active users around the globe, half of whom login to the
website on daily basis [1]. The average user has 130 friends,
spends 60 minutes on the network every day and creates 90
pieces of content per month. 20 million new applications are
installed by its users every day. In April 2010, Facebook
launched its social plugin to integrate with other websites.
Since the launch, 2.5 million websites have integrated into
Facebook. In addition, Facebook provides a mobile platform
used by 250 million people, who according to Facebook, are
twice as active on the network as the non-mobile users. In
2010, Experian Hitwise named Facebook as the most visited
website for the second consecutive year [8].
The large volume of data produced, and shared, the vast
number of users, limited number of employees (The ratio of
Facebook users to employees is approximately 250000:1 [1])
and its rapid success has not given the social networking site
enough time to take care of all its privacy violations. One
such point which is widely on the news, heavily researched
1This is only the extended abstract. For the full version of the paper please
consult the proceedings of SESOC 2012, March 19, 2012 (IEEE PerCom
Workshop 2012, March 19-23, 2012).
academically and a cause of concern for Facebook officials,
is the issue of Privacy of its users. The importance of the
issue could be guessed from the very fact that a Google
search, on November 7th 2011, returns 6.13 billion results
for “Facebook”+ “Privacy” while it returns only 212 million
results for “Iraq” +“war”. This simple Google search makes
Facebook privacy 28.91 times more famous (or infamous) than
the Iraq war. Note that, Google search results are not cent
percent accurate [12], they give an estimated value.
Employers have used Facebook to hire or fire employees on
the basis of their behaviour on social networks [14]. Universi-
ties can screen applicants or ensure discipline by monitoring
their students on social networks [4]. According to a survey by
Social Media Examiner, 92% marketers use Facebook as a tool
[16]. Phishers have improved their techniques by personalizing
their schemes based on the data they acquire from social
networks and are shown to be more useful than the traditional
phishing schemes [9], [15]. A woman in Indiana (US) was
robbed by a Facebook friend after she posted on her Facebook
profile that she was going out for the night [13].
Facebook was initially launched as a student social network,
its approach to privacy was initially network centric, which
meant all data shared by users was visible to all the members
of the network [17]. The privacy settings were changed several
times till it reached the present form, where by default different
levels of users information is visible to “Friends” , “Friends
of Friends” and “Everyone”. Today, Facebook does allow the
option of sharing the information only with the user through
“Only Me” option in the privacy settings, in addition to
applying exception of the rules to specific groups of people,
called “lists”. It has been shown in the literature, that users
rarely change the default settings [11], [5].
As Facebook’s default settings evolved to a level where not
all information was visible to the user’s network, attackers
and researchers tried to get information from what is publicly
available. Since information uploaded by the users is expected
to be shown to their friends only on Facebook [3], information
flow (and so leakage) to friends is considered authorized. We
analyze the impact of an attacker being able to be visible on
the friendlist of a user temporarily and then hide beneath an
invisibility cloak. This is the focus of this paper.
2II. SUMMARY OF OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Deactivated Friend Attack
Our deactivated friend attack occurs when an attacker adds
their victim on Facebook and then deactivates her own ac-
count. As deactivation is temporary in Facebook, the attacker
can reactivate her account as she pleases and repeat the process
of activating and deactivating for unlimited number of times.
While a friend is deactivated on Facebook, she becomes
invisible. She could not be unfriended (removed from friend’s
list) or added to any specific list. The only privacy changes
that may apply to her are those applied to all friends or the
particular list of which it is already a member.
This deactivated friend i.e. the attacker may later reactivate
the account and crawl her victims profiles for any updated
information. Once the crawling has finished, the attacker will
deactivate again. While activated, the attacker is visible on the
victim’s friend list. The concept here is very similar to that of
cloaking in Star Trek where Badass Blink or Jem’Hadar has
to uncloak (be visible), even if only for a moment, to open
fire. Facebook provides no notification about the activation or
deactivation of friends to its users.
1) Detection and restriction of the attacker as a friend:
As the attacker has to uncloak to spy, there is a probability of
being detected and unfriended or put under restricted privacy
policies. This probability will be dependent on several factors
including the probability the victim checks their own friendlist
(p1), the probability the user is online when the attacker
is de-cloaked (p2), the probability the victim checks their
profile page (p3), the probability the victim checks their friends
preview (Facebook shows thumbnails and names of 10 friends
on the left side of user’s profile page) (p4), the probability of
the attacker being available on the friends preview (p5), the
probability of the victim getting suspicious about the attacker
after finding him on the friendlist and then attempting to
restrict or unfriend her (p6), the probability that the victim will
be able to apply the restriction before the attacker deactivates
considering the time they both have (p7) and finally the
probability of other factors (p8). For simplicity, assuming
independence, the probability of the attacker being restricted
is,
pr = p1p2p6p7 + (1− p1)
8∏
i=2
pi
To get a better insight into probabilities p1, p2, p3 and
p4 we did a survey in which 76 people took part. In our
survey, 48.5% participants selected 18:01-21:00 hours, while
only 9.1% selected 00:01-06:00 hours as their most likely time
to login to Facebook. The attacker may use this information
and activate only when the user is least likely to login. The
time zone of the user could be found from the current city
details on the profile, if provided, or the locations details in
status messages. 79% survey takers checked their friend list
on less than 20% of the occasions when using Facebook. The
low percentage of people checking the friend list is justified
because Facebook allows searching for the friend of interest
in the search box, so there is not much of a need to scroll
down the friend list where on average a Facebook user has 130
friends [1]. These friends in the list are arranged by alphabeti-
cal order based on their first names. Any name starting with a
character close to the end of the alphabet will be less likely to
be viewed by the user. Moreover, 74.4% users checked their
profile page less than 51% of the times they used Facebook.
This high percentage does not check their Facebook profile
page because when a user logs in to the social networking
website, the default page is the home page. The home page
is the epicenter of most social things including the newsfeed
and events. The user is also given an option to update her
status from the home page. Moreover, any notifications give a
direct link to the comment or activity. All these things make
the users own profile page less attractive to being checked
often. Furthermore, the survey showed 50% people claimed
to glance 20% or less times at their friends preview when
they check their profile page. Eyetracking analysis could give
further insight to the correctness of this percentage distribution
[7]. With a repeated use of Facebook, the user’s mind is trained
to search for new information in the center of the page, where
the messages, videos, photos etc, are posted. The scroll bar
is on the righthand side, making it a better place for the
advertisements to be placed. The friends quick view is on
the lefthand side, so it is not the most likely place to catch
attention. But attention might also depend on other factors like
the colors on the page, the details of the pictures available etc.
A photo that could mix more with the background might not be
that attractive or eye catching. Similarly, the use of a network
name under the name of attacker might change the probability
of eyes getting attracted to the friend in the preview. Moreover,
different names may have different impacts.
Probability p5 is also not very hard to estimate. Out of
the 10 friends shown on the preview roughly 7 are those
with whom the user has recently interacted on Facebook.
The remaining 3 friends for the preview will be selected
randomly (Facebook friend preview algorithms are not public,
these results are estimated from our observation). Having 130
friends on average, the likelihood of the attacker ending up
on the friends list is, roughly 3/130. The Friend preview is
cached by Facebook, so once the user logs in, the same 10
friends are displayed in random order.
The attacker may use multiple pseudonyms to be present as
several deactivated friends on the victims profile so removal
or identification of one of the attacker profiles might still
undermine privacy.
2) Seriousness of the attack: The attack is very serious for
several reasons. First, it is very hard to detect this attack. The
attacker can activate her account at the moment least likely
to be detected and crawl her victims profile for information,
keeping an updated record. Various groups of information ag-
gregators including marketers, background checking agencies,
governments, hackers, spammers, stalkers and criminals would
find this attractive as a permanent back door to the private
information of a Facebook user, once befriended. Secondly,
a user may not be privacy conscious initially but, with the
large media coverage or personal experience become much
more concerned. Then, he may want to adjust his privacy
settings on social networks like Facebook. With this attack,
and the attacker being cloaked, the victim will not be able to
3apply any updates, unless they are applied to all friends, or
to lists of which the attacker is a member. Thirdly, when the
attacker can closely monitor a few users on Facebook, they
can get a deeper insight into a large network. The attacker
could be a cloaked spy monitoring and analyzing them.
Facebook recently added the feature of browsing friendships.
This would help the attacker in analyzing the bond between
two of his victims by browsing their friendship which provides
information including the month and year since when they are
Facebook friends, the events they both attended, their mutual
friends, things they both like, their photos, the messages they
wrote on each others wall, etc. This would give a very deep
insight about the level of their relationship, the duration when
they were more or less interactive, etc. This information could
be used for several attacks including social engineering and
social phishing attacks.
3) Being befriended at the first place: The attacker requires
to be friends with his victim in the first place. This could
be done in many different ways. The attacker could send a
random friend request and see if accepted. She could create
the profile of a famous scientist e.g., someone has made the
profile of Claude Shannon and has got 156 friends2. There are
Facebook profiles made for animals3. Psychologically we do
not feel a threat from some animals, so if profiles for them
are made on Facebook then users will feel less threatened.
Also, the attacker could use social engineering by pretending
to be an acquaintance or real life friend of the victim, but not
yet a Facebook friend. Another approach would be to pretend
to be someone the victim met at a conference or during a
social event. By default, Facebook uses encryption only for
login, so a man in the middle attack or session hijacking
is not very difficult. The attacker could use this technique
to take over a session, accept himself as a friend, remove
the notification of friendship (to avoid suspicion) and then
deactivate the attacking account. Other possible attacks could
include using clickjacking to be automatically accepted as a
friend, the traditional use of keyloggers, OS vulnerabilities,
browser vulnerabilities, smart phone hacks, etc.
4) Experimental Results: To prove the ease of being be-
friended on Facebook we ran an experiment for 606 days. The
experiment was divided into three phases: the first phase was
targeting befriending of users, the second phase was getting
into the cloaked mode and temporarily de-cloaking for updates
and the third phase was permanent de-cloaking to see how
many users unfriend a stranger (whom they once added).
a) Phase 1: We created a Facebook account under a
pseudonym, for experimental purposes, on February 15, 2010.
For the first 99 days we requested 225 users to be friends
on Facebook, out of which 90 people accepted our request.
During this time we did not allow other users to add us as
friends. We wanted to get closer to the circles of our potential
targets and did not want other random requests. On the 100th
2http://www.facebook.com/claude.shannon - Checked on November 7,
2011, Shannon’s profile might be made by a fan to pay tribute but similar
approaches can be used by attackers.
3The profile of a cat at the first author’s residential hall
has 159 friends, this could again be used to spy on users -
http://www.facebook.com/CelebratingStarlight .
day, we started accepting requests from other people. With the
acception of friend requests our probability of being accepted
by our desired group kept increasing. During the course of
285 days of phase 1 of the experiment, we sent 595 friend
requests out of which 370 were accepted, resulting in an
average success rate of 62%. We received a total of 3969
requests from day 100 till day 285 which are 6.67 times more
than the number of requests we sent. Till Day 285 we had
added 4339 users as friends. This is when we decided to move
to phase 2 of the experiment.
b) Phase 2: In phase 2 of the experiment we went into
the cloaked mode with temporary de-cloaking to get updates
about our friends on Facebook. The phase continued for a
total of 261 days with de-cloaking at regular intervals. We de-
cloaked for only 10 minutes in each session, which is enough
time to crawl hundred of profiles. We were able to observe
all our Facebook friends during the de-cloaking except those
who had deactivated their accounts and were in the cloaked
mode. None of our friends could technically have, unfriended
us during this phase.
c) Phase 3: The first and second phase of the experiment
took a long time and with the awareness about privacy
increasing we expected that users will remove strangers from
their friendlist, once they are given an option. So, we left the
account in de-cloaked mode, with no activity, for 60 days.
We noticed a shrink of 239 users in our friendlist. This may
indicate that about 5.5% people got privacy conscious with the
extended awareness and started removing strangers from their
friendlists.
5) Reflections and Ethical consideration: As mentioned in
the work by Boshmaf et. al. [6], very low risk experiments
are the only way to analyze the real world impact of such
vulnerabilities in social networks used by hundreds of millions
of users.
Ethics of the research were strongly considered during the
experimental phase. We did not save any identifiable personal
information. We will apologize to all those who took part in
the study, delete the account before the end of the conference
and inform Facebook to fix the vulnerability.
Moreover, the use of pseudonyms can be considered as a
measure of remaining anonymous which is protected by the
first amendment of the constitution of the United States, in
the context of freedom of speech e.g., [2], [10]. This raises
an important question whether organizations like Facebook or,
until recently, Google were following the law when preventing
users from using measures of anonymity for the use of their
respective social networks. Further discussion of the topic is
beyond the scope fo the paper.
B. Solutions
We now provide some solutions to the attack,
• Users should be notified about the activation and deacti-
vation of their friends. Using this a user may report any
suspicion to Facebook.
• Flag the users who activate and deactivate their accounts
several times. Then they could be further monitored for any
4suspicious activities and permanently banned by Facebook.
Alternatively, if users are notified about the activation and
deactivation of the accounts of their friends, then a Facebook
application can be developed which monitors such changes
and automatically jails (reduces the view of a victims
account) a person during the short span of de-cloaking or
even unfriend them.
• The deactivated friends should still be visible in the users
friend list (may be blurred) such that the privacy settings
applied to them maybe changed. It should also be made
possible to remove them from the friend list.
• Permanent deactivation of accounts with no reactivation
as is done in Google+, Orkut and Twitter can be another
alternative.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a privacy loophole in Facebook in
which the attacker temporarily deactivates his account to avoid
detection and removal from the friend list, but reactivates to
crawl the victims data. We also discussed the impact of the
attack, the possibility of it being detected and the possible
groups of users who may be interested in using this attack.
To support our claims of ease of targeted befriending of users
on Facebook we conducted an experiment where on average
62% of our friend requests were accepted. We tested the
cloaking attack for 261 days and none of our Facebook friends
unfriended during the course. We conducted a survey to get
further insights into the user’s behavior and make the attack
more stealthy. Finally, we provided some recommendations
about possible solutions to the problem. We wonder whether
other cloaked channels exist.
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